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Semi-Presidentialism
In the politological debate on the char-
acterisation of (democratic) govern-
mental system, the stand of the „semi-
presidential” category is far from 
secured. Some see it as a deviation à la 
française from the presidential system; 
for example, Shugart/Carey speak of 
„premier-presidential systems”.1
Others tend to prioritize relational over 
dispositional features. This means that 
denomination of a political system de-
pends also on the concrete powers the 
president possesses in relation to other 
State institutions. Based on the assump-
tion that only „executive power” would 
allow the president to „enter a double 
authority structure with the prime min-
ister”, Sartori for example excludes Ire-
land, Austria, and Iceland form the 
semi-presidential group.2
However, for the sake of terminological 
accuracy and comparative clarity, three 
(dispositional) dimensions are taken 
into consideration when defining semi-
1  Matthew S Shugart, John M Carey (1992), 
Presidents and Assemblies – Constitutional 
Design and Electoral Dynamics, New York : 
Cambridge University Press, p. 23.
2  Giovanni Sartori, (2004), „Verso una costi-
tuzione incostituzionale?”, in Ingegneria 
costituzionale comparata. Strutture, incen-
tivi ed esiti, Bologna: Il Mulino, p. 146.
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Semi-presidential systems of 
democratic governance risk 
ending up in a stalemate when it 
is not clear which of the two 
„heads” – head of State or head 
of Government – shall take the 
lead. The current political 
situation in Romania features 
some of the commonly observed 
characteristics of such an 
institutional blockade. However, 
after addressing these formal 
aspects of political Romania, the 
author argues for not forgetting 
to take into account the informal, 
actor-related factors. The nature 
of the Romanian political parties 
and party system seems to hinder 
the finding of a consensus 
needed to exit the self-imposed 
blockade. More specifically, it is 
the Democratic Party (PD) that is 
the key to understanding the 
recent developments. The 
Government of April the third has 
yet to prove its efficiency.
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presidential systems.1 First, we look at the composition of the executive, and ask: Is 
the head of State also sole head of Government? In semi-presidential system this is 
not the case.2
Then, we ask for origin and survival of the respective heads. Is the head of State 
popularly elected and taking office for a fixed term, then the second criterion of 
semi-presidentialism is fulfilled. The third criterion for a system to qualify as semi-
presidential refers to the head of Government: His stay in power must be linked to 
the confidence – or „non-diffidence”, in Duverger’s words3 – of parliament.
The Prime Minister (PM) may be appointed by the president, but it is the parliament 
that institutes the appointee in his office: either implicitly – by not tendering a cen-
sure motion – or explicitly – by a vote of investiture. These very rudimentary cogita-
tions can be summed up in the definition of semi-presidential systems as republican 
democracies featuring a dual executive, which in turn is made up of:
1. A president, elected through popular vote for a fixed term-mandate; and
2. A Prime Minister, dependent on the parliament’s confidence or at least non-
diffidence.
Before we proceed to the analysis of the Romanian „serious political turmoil” (PNL-
deputy Ludovic Orban),4 we have to consider two specific elements of any semi-
presidential system: dual authority and cohabitation. In fact, the latter is but one 
possible consequence of the former.
Dual Authority
The popular election of the president may seem symbolic only, all the more when his 
position is not also endowed with specific powers. Nonetheless, a dual authority 
structure is constitutionally installed, as both PM and president are „heads” of Gov-
ernment and of State, respectively.
Authority (lat. auctoritas), in this sense, must not be confounded with power (pot-
estas). The latter, in politics and political science at least, refers to the ability to 
„make and implement collectively binding decisions.”5 Authority is considered here 
more as repute and leverage.6 Authority relates to two elements that will be consid-
ered in turn: legitimacy and political institutions.
We said that the popular election of the president is more than symbolic. However, 
one should not go as far as for example Charles de Gaulle, when saying that 
„l’autorité indivisible de l’Etat est confiée tout entière au président par le people 
1  Cf. Robert Elgie (1999), „The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism”, in Robert Elgie, Semi-Presi den-
tialism in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-21.
2  Alan Siaroff (2003), “Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-
Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction”, in European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 42, 
No. 3, 287-3 12, p. 293.
3  Maurice Duverger(1980): „A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government”, in 
European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 8, No. 2, 165-187, p. 166.
4  Cit. in Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 30.3.07.
5  Dieter Fuchs, (2001), „Types and Indices of Democratic Regimes”, Discussion Paper FS III 01-203, 
Wissenschaftszentrumn Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 1-21, p. 5.
6  Manfred G. Schmidt (2004), Wörterbuch zur Politik. Stuttgart: Kröner, p. 69.
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qui l’a élu.”1 The legitimacy of the president would be higher than the one of parlia-
ment because it is not divided into various seats, but remains in the hands of one 
single person, the president. But parliament as well is elected by the people – in fact, 
the electorate. And, mathematically speaking, parliament represents the people 
more adequately.2 A familiar example: President Basescu received some 5 million 
votes in the second round, while the parties that entered parliament represent to-
gether more than 10 million Romanians. 
To quote again Maurice Duverger, „father” of the semi-presidential concept:
[…] l’ensemble des députés représente la totalité du people, car la minorité y 
figure aux cotés de la majorité. Leur dialogue permanent constitue l’essence 
même de la vie parlementaire, qui reflète ainsi toute la vie nationale. Cela don-
ne au parlement une prééminence de droit. Il demeure le fondement principal 
du régime semi-présidentiel, malgré l’élection du chef de l’Etat au suffrage uni-
versel.3
However, the structure of dual authority is an inherent element of semi-presiden-
tialism. Authority is situated on the institutional (formal) level, in this case the pres-
idency and the Prime Ministry. We said that power means the concrete ability to 
make decisions that are collectively binding. It is political actors that make such deci-
sions – more specifically, in democracies: parliament and the parliamentary majority. 
To what extent the president can influence this process is fixed in the constitution, 
but depends also on the specific constellation of political parties.4
Dual authority, then, means that a competition between the president and the PM 
is possible in principle. The dual authority structure consists of three elements:
1. The president is independent from parliament, but can not govern alone or 
directly: Directives have to be issued and mediated by „his” Government.
2. The PM and his cabinet are independent from the president in the degree they 
are dependent from parliament: They have to be able to count on a majority at 
least when it comes to votes of confidence, or of non-confidence.
3. The dual authority structure allows various equilibria between and inside the 
branches of executive power, because it always sustains a „potential autonomy” 
of every unit or component of the executive.5
We have here anther reason to categorize semi-presidentialism as a regime type of 
its own: A semi-presidential system can not become „presidential” – simply by the 
fact that the president controls the parliamentary majority – because it is structur-
ally different whether the president governs directly, or through an „added” Gov-
ernment. Neither can a semi-presidential system become „parliamentarian” – in 
cases of cohabitation for example – because a directly elected president has a differ-
ent character (and authority) than a president chosen by the parliament.6 In both 
cases, there „may be an actor whose role is not characteristic for pure presidential 
or parliamentarian systems and whose particular influence on the functioning of 
the political system cannot be neutralized.”7
1  Cit. în Maurice Duverger (1978),  Echèc au Roi. Paris, Paris: Albin Michel, p. 143.
2  Ibidem. p. 68.
3  Ibidem. p. 69.
4  Cf. the chapter „A Theory of Presidential Power” in the author’s master’s thesis.
5  Sartori, Op. cit. p. 146.
6  Ibidem. p. 139.
7  Oleh Protsyk (1997), Do Institutions Matter? Semi-Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective. 
Ed. by the Institute on East Central Europe, Budapest, p. 14.
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Semi-presidential systems exhibit a dual or „flexible authority” with – quite literally 
– two executive „heads”. The supremacy goes to the head who controls the parlia-
mentary majority. If the party of the president holds or somehow controls the ma-
jority, then the president prevails. In cases of cohabitation, the Prime Minister pre-
vails. The key to understanding the functioning of semi-presidential system is the 
connection between formal powers and political parties in Parliament.1
Again: any real power depends on the interplay of formal powers (constitutional 
prerogatives associated with institutions, e.g. the presidency) and majority power 
(based on political parties). 
Cohabitation
The second distinctiveness of semi-presidentialism is cohabitation. Cohabitation is 
the situation where „a directly elected president governs with a parliamentary ma-
jority from a different party-political couleur.”2 More specifically, cohabitation is the 
„exceptional and temporal” transformation of the dual authority structure into 
„competitive diarchy”.3
Cohabitation must be distinguished from „divided government” which can take 
place only in presidential systems: a president, who is by definition both head of 
State and of Government, and an assembly dominated by the opposition – the USA 
since the last Congress elections. Since presidential systems are of „mutual inde-
pendence”, the assembly cannot make the Government fall, nor can the Govern-
ment induce new elections.4
Neither is cohabitation the same as a minority Government. On the contrary, minor-
ity Governments are tolerated by the assembly, mostly because there is no one sin-
gle parliamentary majority, only a plurality.5 In moments of plenary voting, ad-hoc 
majorities support the cabinet without being formally part of it.6 Minority Govern-
ments can happen also in semi-presidential systems, but cohabitation cannot hap-
pen in parliamentarian systems.
Romanian Semi-Presidentialism
It may now be clear what semi-presidential systems are. But is Romania a semi-
presidential system? Sartori, in line with his definition, denies that. He describes 
Romania as „parliamentarian with a President who is strong, but not strong enough 
1  Giovanni Sartori, Op. cit., p. 139.
2  Manfred G. Schmidt, Op. cit., p. 138.
3  Gianfranco Pasquino (1997), „Semi-presidentialism: A Political Model at Work”, in European 
Journal of Political Research, Vol. 31, No. 1, 128-146, pp. 130-131.
4  Alfred Stepan, Cindy Skach (1993), „Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: 
Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism” în World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1-22, p. 4. The Eu-
ropean „Government” refers to the cabinet, while the American „government” means the 
whole set of political institutions.
5  (Absolute) Majority: half plus one seat; plurality: less than half of total seats but still the 
biggest share (synonymous to relative majority); cf. Schmidt, Op. cit. p. 450.
6  Oleh Protsyk (2005), „Politics of Intra-Executive Conflict in Semi-Presidential Regimes in 
Eastern Europe”, in East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 19, No. 2, 135-160, p. 156.
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to modify the parliamentarian nature of the system.”1 And one year later as „a par-
liamentarian system reinforced by the direct popular election of the head of State, 
the President.”2
However, by using the dispositional definition outlined above, this text can qualify 
Romania as having a semi-presidential system. Traian Basescu was elected President of 
Romania by the end of 2004, and the person designated by him to form a cabinet, 
Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, succeeded in passing the parliamentary vote of investiture.
Table 1 summarizes the Romanian democratic experience, synonymous to its semi-pres-
idential system for it was installed immediately after the regime change in 1989/91: The 
constitution-making process was dominated by the National Salvation Front (FSN), es-
tablished one day prior to Ceausescu’s getaway from the top of the PCR’s Central Com-
mittee. The FSN’s Council (CFSN) named Petre Roman as Prime Minister through Decree 
no. 1 of 26 December 1989, and by the end of the year a Government was installed.3
Under heavy critique mainly from the „historical” parties (PNT-CD, PNL, PSDR), re-
established in the meantime, the CFSN dissolved itself in February 1990 and consti-
tuted a Provisional Council of National Unity (CPUN), the „Romanian version of 
round-table discussions.”4 However, in the CPUN the FSN still held 50% of the seats, 
which ensured it control of the decisions to take.
It was in CPUN that the semi-presidential system of government was chosen. As 
early as 14 March 1990 – only one month after its creation – the CPUN issued the 
Decree-Law no. 92 that foresaw the establishment of a popularly elected presidency 
alongside a Government depending on a two-chamber parliament.5
Table 1: Presidents, Majorities, and PMs in Romania 1990–now (March 2007)
Period President
Parliamentary Majority
(total % of seats in Deputies’ 
Chamber)
Prime Minister
1990–1992 Iliescu I (FSN)
FSN (66.24) Petre Roman (FSN)
FSN1 + PNL (73.54) Theodor Stolojan (n/p)2
1992–1996 Iliescu II (FDSN)
FDSN/PDSR3 (34) Nicolae Vacaroiu I (n/p)
PDSR + PRM + PUNR + PSM 
(51.60)
Nicolae Vacaroiu II (n/p; 
PDSR)
PDSR (34) Nicolae Vacaroiu III (PDSR)
1996–2000 Constantinescu (CDR)
CDR4 + USD5 + UDMR (58.29)
Victor Ciorbea (PNT-CD)
Radu Vasile (PNT-CD)
CDR + PD + PSDR + UDMR (58.29) Mugur Isarescu (n/p)
1  Giovanni Sartori(2002), „Sul Sistema Costituzionale Romeno”,  in Studia Politica – Romanian 
Political Science Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, 9-12, p. 10.
2  Giovanni Sartori, (2003), „Alcuni Chiaramenti sul Semipresidenzialismo”, in Studia Politica 
– Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 617-620, p. 617.
3  Decree-Law no. 10 of 31 December 1989 for the constitution, organisation and function of the 
Government of Romania.
4  Steven D. Roper (2000): Romania – The Unfinished Revolution. Amsterdam: Harwood Aca-
demic, p. 66.
5  Renate Weber (2001), „Constitutionalism as a Vehicle for Democratic Consolidation in Ro-
mania”. in Jan Zielonka,  Alex Pravda (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Vol. 1: 
Institutional Engineering., New York: Oxford University Press, 212-242, p. 217.
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2000–2004 Iliescu III (PDSR) PDSR6 + UDMR (52.74) Adrian Nastase (PDSR/PSD)
2004–now Basescu (ADA)
ADA7 + UDMR + PUR/PC8 + 
minorities (51.51)
Calin Popescu-Tariceanu 
(PNL)
ADA + UDMR + minorities 
(42.86)
Calin Popescu-Tariceanu 
(PNL)
Notes:
1 The FSN’s pro-Iliescu factions formed an own party, the FDSN, in March 1992
2 „n/p” means no party membership (technocratic PMs)
3 The FDSN changed its name to PDSR in June 1993
4 Multiparty alliance („Convention”) whose major member parties are PNT-CD and PNL
5 Two-party alliance („Union”) consisting of PD and PSDR; dissolved in May 1999
6 Alliance („Pole”) between PDSR, PUR, and PSDR. On 16 June 2001, PDSR absorbed the PSDR to 
form the PSD
7 „Political alliance” consisting of PNL and PD
8 The PUR changed its name to PC on 8 May 2005
The Constituent Assembly was elected in May 1990, consisting of the Deputies’ 
Chamber and the Senate. At the same time, Romania chose for the first time in his-
tory its chief of State in a pluralistic election. The Constituent Assembly was given 
the double task to draft the new constitution and adopt the most urgent reforms. 
The FSN won two thirds in the legislative elections, and Iliescu was elected President 
with 85% of the valid votes.1
It is understandable that the constitution, approved in a referendum in December 
1991, deviates only slightly from the Decree-Law no. 92, in terms of structure and 
powers of the President and the parliament.2
The establishment of a dual authority structure seems to be a compromise between 
a system with too much personal power – where the head of State is also head of 
Government and popularly elected – and one with too few – where parliament only 
has full control over the Government.
Romanian Dual Authority
More than a decade later, Romania proceeded to hold its fifth democratic elections, 
through which Members of Parliament (MPs) and the President are elected. Proba-
bly for the last time, the legislative elections and the first round of the presidential 
elections were held on the same day – the new constitution of 2003 augmented the 
President’s term from four to five years.3
The battle for parliament in November 2004 was fought mainly between two „par-
ty electoral coalitions”, i.e. groupings „composed of individual member-parties that 
form an electoral coalition which is transformed into a parliamentary coalition.”4
On the one side, there was the „National Union” between Social-Democrats (PSD) 
and the Humanist Party (PUR), and on the other side the „Justice and Truth Alli-
1  Steven D. Roper, Op. cit., p. 67.
2  Renate Weber, Op. cit. p. 218.
3  Art. 83. 1
4  Steven D. Ropper (1998), „From Opposition to Government Coalition: Unity and Fragmentation 
within the Democratic Convention of Romania” in East European Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4, 519-
542, p. 519.
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ance” of Liberals (PNL) and Democrats (PD) – in Romanian: Alianta Dreptate si Ade-
varul (ADA). The difference between the two was that the DA-Alliance benefited 
from the juridical status of „political alliance”, while the Union consisted in a – 
merely semantic – „electoral alliance”.1
This distinction may not be important when it comes to vote in parliament, yet it shows 
how the same electoral result of 28 November 2004 can be interpreted differently: in 
terms of political parties, PSD appeared as the clear winner, with a total 160 seats. But 
in terms of political alliances, the DA-Alliance wins most: a total of 161 mandates.2
As stated above, even in semi-presidential regimes it is parliament through its ma-
jority that holds power. „Majority power” is the capacity to make parliament as a 
whole decide along one’s programme, based on the majority-rule principle of de-
mocracy. In Romania, at the end of 2004, there were, within a month, three parlia-
mentary majorities.3
The first parliamentary majority installed itself right after the parliamentary elec-
tions. On 6 December 2004, the party of ethnic Hungarians (UDMR) and PSD agreed 
to form a common Government. Yet on the same day, PUR-president Dan Voiculescu 
declared that his agreement with PSD was made up of three stages: common lists in 
the parliamentary election, support of a single presidential candidate, and collabo-
ration in the Government formation process. PUR and PSD decided to postpone 
negotiations on the cabinet until the presidential run-off was over.4 Nevertheless, 
three days before the run-off, Adrian Nastase, in his function as PSD-president, de-
clared that „at the moment, a parliamentary majority exists.”5
On 12 December 2004 then, Traian Basescu (ADA) won the race for President against 
Nastase (PSD). He immediately set his priority as forming „a comfortable majority 
around the ADA” to implement its 11-points electoral program. Basescu explicitly 
invited PUR and UDMR to „analyze the possibility of joining the Alliance” to form 
another parliamentary majority.6 PUR-president Dan Voiculescu answered vaguely 
that his party would indeed be „independent”, because an electoral alliance and a 
political alliance were not the same, but that as for now, the „political morality” 
would favour PSD.7 On 15 December, Basescu increased the pressure:
I will appoint Calin Popescu Tariceanu Prime Minister. If I cannot fulfil the man-
date I was given by the people, I will turn to the people. […] If the Government 
of the Alliance does not pass, we will certainly go back to the early elections. I 
think that the President, who is elected by direct vote, has a right to decide on 
the party he wants to work with so that his own programme promoted during 
the election campaign will become reality.8
1  Cristian Pîrvulescu (2005), Partidele Romanesti în 2005. Paper presented at the Conference 
„Partidele de centru dreapta în Romania”, Bucharest, p. 8; can be downloaded using the following 
link: http://www.kas.ro/kas/fileadmin/user_upload/_temp_/Situatia_partidelor_politice_din_
Romania_in_2005-C.pdf.
2  Lavinia Stan(2005), „The Opposition Takes Charge. The Romanian General Elections of 2004”, 
in Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 52, No. 3, 3- 15, p. 12.
3  Daniel Barbu (2005), „Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy? The Intended Consequences of the 2004 
Romanian Elections”, in Studia Politica – Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 9-17, p. 12.
4  Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 7.12.04.
5  Cit. in Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 10.12.04.
6  Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro 14.12.04.
7  Cit. in Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 14.12.04, and 20. 
12. 04.
8  Cit. in Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro 16. 12. 04.
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Immediately afterwards, UDMR deferred the signing of a parliamentary coopera-
tion protocol with PSD, and announced, through its president Marko Bela: „We do 
not want early elections. The top priority is political stability.”1 Yet PUR did not give 
in, and even supported the PSD-candidates for the offices of speaker of the House 
of Deputies (Adrian Nastase) and of the Senate (Nicolae Vacaroiu), on 20.12.04. Tak-
ing into account that the chairmen elections happened with the votes of PSD, PUR, 
and PRM, this second, parliamentary majority, albeit completely circumstantial, 
mounted to a total of 259 seats, or 55.2% of all seats.2
The Humanists joined the ADA-UDMR-coalition only after President Basescu had 
nominated Calin Popescu-Tariceanu Prime Minister, on 23 December 2004.3 Thus, 
the third and final parliamentary majority consisted of ADA, UDMR, PUR, and could 
win the minorities’ support, leading to a total of 241 seats (51.4%) in parliament.4
The change from a centre-left majority (PSD-PUR-UDMR-minorities: 51.2%) to a cen-
tre-right majority (DA-UDMR-PUR-minorities: 51.4%) was operated in less than one 
month. This can be explained by cynical opportunism to side with the winner, or by 
the normal function of political parties: seeking political representation.
Romanian Political Parties
Over the years 2005 and 2006, the constellation in the Romanian executive trans-
formed into a de facto cohabitation. As of March 2007, PD-president Emil Boc stated 
that „for the time being, the Alliance with PNL is like a marriage no longer working, 
but a divorce has not been settled.”5 As we will see further on, it is exactly this an-
thropomorphic conception of political parties that hinders the finding of a consen-
sus, or, less demanding, of a modus vivendi allowing to efficiently and legitimately 
continue the exercise of power in Romania.
In the words of Cristian Preda, it became evident at the time of Government forma-
tion in 2004 that the party system is „multi-party” without a dominant party, and 
the consequence is a need to ”fabricate” a majority.6 This fabrication takes place 
even by annihilating electoral understandings (PSD and PUR forming the Union) and 
political agreements (PSD and UDMR). It seems that the same process takes place in 
the beginning of March, when, in PD’s view, by „excluding” PD from the new Gov-
ernment, „PNL has broken the protocol of the Alliance.”7
Barbu reminds of the Italian partitocrazia as „a method of government in which 
parties hold jointly the complete monopoly of all political personnel, resources and 
policy”, and where political parties not only colonize all public institutions that 
make up the political regime, but „become the regime itself.”8 Without following 
this thought further – our focus is the conflict between Basescu and Tariceanu and 
not the party system as such – his conclusion is nevertheless highly relevant here:
1  Cit. in Ibidem.
2  Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 21.12.04.
3  Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 24.12.04.
4  Lavinia Stan, Op. cit., p. 12.
5  Cit. in Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 27.3.07.
6  Cristian Preda (2005), Partide şi Alegeri în România Postcomunistă (1989-2004). Bucharest: 
Nemira, p. 100.
7  Emil Boc; cit. in Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro 3.4.07.
8  Daniel Barbu, Op. cit., p. 11.
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[…] whatever the results of an election, nobody looses and nobody wins. Losses 
and gains should rather be shared by all parties-in-Parliament. This is why the 
President can always muster up a presidential majority. Like in any dualist re-
gime, the head of state is both the executive officer and the warrant of a stable 
ad established party system. As the constitutional resident of the Palace is, since 
1990, elected by universal suffrage, it entails that the only election that really 
does matter is the presidential one.1
The personalisation of parties, the concurrent timing of parliamentary and presi-
dential elections, the opportunistic nature of the party system, and the balanced 
result were factors that favoured an „involved” role of the President already in the 
Government formation process.
Basescu has made it clear from the very beginning – indeed already in the electoral 
campaign – what his conception of the presidency looks like:
The power granted by the Constitution to the President is to be an active and 
efficient player in the public life of Romania, not just a well-intended spectator. 
I have never been a non-involved person. I do not want to be a spectator-Presi-
dent, who occupies the best seat on the official dais, what I want to be is a 
playing President, who is working shoulder to shoulder with the other respon-
sible factors and the whole society.2
Adding this personal will to the institutional dimension of the office (authority) 
alone does not explain the power President Basescu enjoyed at certain moments. 
Nor do the concrete constitutional prerogatives3 connected to the office of Presi-
dent explain his ability to, for example, block the nomination of a new Foreign 
Minister.4
Basescu has been and Tariceanu still is president of a political party, and this is one 
reason why the „war of palaces” sometimes degenerated into a „war of declara-
tions”, but was always a conflict between political parties. The other reason is that 
anyway, in democracies, politics is made in parliament and through parties. Thus, it 
is through the Democratic Party (PD) that President Basescu becomes so powerful, 
more specifically: through PD’s recognition of Basescu as de facto leader.
Of course, the shift from one parliamentary majority to another in 2004 would not 
have been possible were Basescu not elected President and had he not threatened 
to call for early elections. But once the cabinet is installed, the President’s influence 
is limited to „matters of national interest with regard to foreign policy, the defence 
of the country, insurance of public order.”5 Political parties are not only the connec-
tor between State institutions and the people; in this specific case of Romanian 
semi-presidentialism, they link presidency, cabinet, and parliament.6
1  Ibidem. p. 14.
2  Cit. in Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 24.11.04.
3  His „powers” of government formation: Art. 85.1 in relation to Art. 102.1; of assembly dissolution: 
Art. 89.1; and of cabinet participation: Art. 86 and 87 of the Romanian Constitution.
4  Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 22.3.07.
5  Art. 87.1 of the Romanian Constitution.
6  Interesting, at this point, that PD and PNL in 2004 agreed to support a common presidential 
candidate, the Liberal Theodor Stolojan. Stolojan was replaced as candidate only two months 
before the 2004 elections by a Democrat, Basescu, and is now president of the Liberal-Democrat 
Party (PLD). The latter is constituted mostly of former Liberals unhappy with Tariceanu’s lea-
dership. (Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 1.4.07) 
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Successor to Petre Roman’s faction of the „revolutionary” FSN, the PD was, between 
1993 and 2005, a social-democratic party. Traian Basescu became president of the PD 
in 2003, but only in 2005, after Basescu had become President of Romania, was the 
party put on a „popular” track.1
Only the PD was able to profit from the President’s popularity after his election, 
with the PNL doomed to grateful acknowledgment of Basescu’s majority „fabrica-
tion”. If the latest polls are to be believed, PD would receive some 34 per cent of the 
votes cast – ahead of PSD (22%), PNL, and PRM (11% each).2
Compared to November 2004, the situation inside ADA seems to have been inversed 
– back then, PNL received 92 seats in Parliament (19.6% of all seats), and PD only 69 
(14.7%).3
Romanian Cohabitation
On 3 April 2007, at 6:29 p.m. Romanian time, parliament approved the new cabinet 
proposed by PM Tariceanu. The PM had sent the proposed list of cabinet members 
to Parliament on 2 April 2007. The new cabinet is composed of 18 persons: 14 from 
PNL, including the PM, and 4 from UDMR, including the office of Vice-PM which 
goes to Marko Bela.4
With the removal of PD from the Government, the reshuffle falls under paragraph 
3 of article 85 of the Romanian constitution, which reads:
If, through the reshuffle proposal, the political structure or composition of the 
Government is changed, the President of Romania shall only be entitled to ex-
ercise the power stipulated under paragraph (2) based on the Parliament’s ap-
proval, granted following the proposal of the Prime Minister.
Paragraph 2 of the same article reads as follows:
In the event of Government reshuffle or vacancy of office, the President shall 
dismiss and appoint, on the proposal of the Prime Minister, some members of 
the Government. 
Thus, through changing the political structure of the Government, the role of Presi-
dent Basescu is relegated approving the cabinet ex-post, for Tariceanu’s proposal is 
now vested with Parliament’s explicit approval.
The vote in parliament was decided by 302 in favour and 27 against; PD and PLD had 
left the chamber beforehand. Explicit backing came from PNL, UDMR, PSD, and the 
minorities’ group, while PRM and PC had announced their opposition.5
By changing from the governmental to the opposition side, and keeping with Bas-
escu as informal party leader, the PD contributed to the first situation of cohabita-
tion in Romania ever. Or, in other words: the de facto cohabitation was simply for-
malized.
1  Lavinia Stan, Op. cit., p. 8.
2  Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 1.4.07.
3  Lavinia Stan, Op. cit., p. 14.
4  Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 1.4.07, and Nine o’Clock, 
Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro 3.4.07.
5  Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 3.4.07.
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Conclusions and Outlook
The constitution is the fundament of a State and its institutions. It gives authority to 
the persons holding certain positions, and at the same time ascribes them powers. 
The exercise of power is commonly distributed among three branches, while with 
regard to semi-presidential systems, one could speak of three-and-a-half branches, 
the President being put „above” the other institutions but still in charge of certain 
tasks that can be associated with the executive.
In Romania, crucial in 2004 were Basescu’s powers to designate a PM-candidate and 
call early elections in case „his” nominee would not have passed the vote of investi-
ture at least two times.1
Formal and informal powers can be separated theoretically, but in practice they of-
ten conflate. Thus, the ability to nominate Tariceanu was based on the ADA being 
the largest „political alliance”, whereas the „threat” of early elections worked only 
due to fears on the side of UDMR and PUR/PC not to pass the 5%-treshold any-
more.
PNL continues the struggle to stay in power, with a PM not willing to give in to the 
President’s wishes. These are the introduction of the uninominal vote, early elec-
tions, and a new constitution to avoid the deadlocks between institutions: 
[…] avem nevoie nu doar de votul uninominal, ci şi de o dezbatere responsabilă 
în privinţa reformei constituţionale. E nevoie de o nouă Constituţie, capabilă să 
evite blocajele instituţionale […]2
PD and probably also PLD will take these three issues of the presidential agenda and 
block all the others. UDMR continues its pragmatism – irony that the only real po-
litical party with a clear agenda is somehow based on ethno-cultural criteria? Along-
side PD to scream against the Government: PRM and PC, for no substantial reason 
though but only because of UDMR’s presence in the cabinet.
The smiling third could be PSD: It continues to have the „authority” of the biggest 
party in parliament – but without being formally part of the Government. It can 
negotiate behind-the scenes compromises without – after failure – assuming re-
sponsibility, but claiming – after success – participation.
Now there is both a situation of cohabitation and a minority cabinet. Government 
will have to rely on at least some opposition votes in order for legislation to pass – 
and the support of the President is doubtful. There is no majority power because 
seats are dispersed on too many parties.
In the lower house, PSD has the plurality (33%). Additionally, there are three mi-
norities:
1. The „governmental” minority: PNL and UDMR with probably extended sup-
port of the minorities’ group: together 28 per cent of the seats in the Chamber 
of Deputies;
2. The „presidential” minority: PD and yet un-officialised PLD, with 19 per cent of 
seats.
3. The „extremist” minority: PRM and PC, together ca. 15 per cent.
1  Art. 85.1 and 89.1 of the Constitution of Romania, respectively.
2  Official Homepage of the Romanian Presidency: www.presidency.ro, accessed on 6.4.07.
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With regard to efficiency and the capacity to exercise power, we can imagine two 
possible scenarios for the future:
1. Status quo: Most likely, according to Basescu’s recent statements, the attitude 
of the President to be a quite active watchdog of governmental projects will not 
change.1 Conflicts at the top continue, poisoning the atmosphere. No substantial 
negotiations are hold, circumstantial ad-hoc majorities dominate the scene, e.g. 
PD/PLD with PRM/PC in a motion of censure, with the PSD abstaining.
2. Improved efficiency of the exercise of rule: This would confir the hypothesis 
that it is better to have behind-the-scenes negotiations than none at al. Even a 
covert PNL-UDMR-PSD cooperation is not „illegal”, as some PD-deputies describe 
it. Political parties have a mandate to impose their programme, and pay-day is on 
election-day.
In other words, a situation worse than the current blockage is hardly possible. Early 
elections will not happen unlike a majority emerges among the political parties in 
parliament to go through the procedure described by the Romanian constitution in 
article 89.1. It is then the President who „may” dissolve parliament – or may not, if 
not also „his” party has prospects of winning. Again, it all comes down to political 
parties and their leaders.
This paper is based on the master’s thesis „Presidential Power in Semi-Presidential 
Systems – The Case of Romania”, delivered to the Philosophical Faculty of the 
University of Fribourg in Summer 2006. The thesis can be downloaded using the 
following link: http://www.federalism.ch/files/documents//THESIS_final.pdf
1  Nine o’Clock, Romanian Daily, Bucharest, http://www.nineoclock.ro, 5.4.07.
